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INTRODUCTION
The United States’ military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have
1
been heavily dependent on civilian contractors. The reliance on
personnel not under the direct control and management of the
2
United States military and the presence of contractors in foreign
battle zones raise significant questions about how military contractors
can be held responsible for their actions abroad. Abuses perpetrated
by military contractors abroad are exemplified by several contractors’
participation—or complicity—in the torture and abuse of Iraqi
3
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison and other locations in Iraq.
In September of 2011, a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided two related cases addressing
the ability of federal courts to review U.S. government contractors’
4
misbehavior in war zones. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc. and Al
5
Shimari v. CACI International, Inc. directly addressed the ability of
foreign citizens to sue government contractors for their actions
6
abroad. The panel reached two conclusions in these cases. First, the
court held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral
7
order doctrine. Second, it held that state tort actions against military
1. See T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 4,
2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4 (noting that
about 180,000 civilian contractors were working in Iraq in 2007, including 21,000
Americans, 118,000 Iraqis, and 43,000 from other countries).
2. Id.; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2011)
(explaining the role of contractors in interrogations in Iraq and detailing the
military procedures applicable to all personnel involved in military detentions,
including contractors), vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11,
2012) (en banc).
3. See CACI, 658 F.3d at 414–16 (recounting that a shortage of military
personnel led the U.S. government to contract with private corporations to conduct
interrogations in Iraq, including at Abu Ghraib prison, where some contractors
allegedly conspired to commit and cover up torture); Diane Marie Amann, Abu
Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085 (2005) (situating images of the torture at Abu
Ghraib in the context of government denials that no United States actors ever
engaged in torture).
4. 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc.,
No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
5. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th
Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
6. Both cases involved suits by Iraqi citizens who claimed to have been held and
tortured by the United States military with the aid of government contractors. L-3
Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414–15.
7. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 203–05.
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contractors are preempted by important federal interests. Rehearing
the cases en banc, the Fourth Circuit dismissed both appeals, holding
that the collateral order doctrine did not confer appellate
9
jurisdiction. This Note will argue that the Fourth Circuit panel
decisions missed an opportunity to clarify the precise nature of the
defense available to military contractors and failed to determine
whether contractors can be held liable at all for their actions
overseas. The en banc decision correctly clarified that contractor
defenses do not rise to the level of immunity from suit, but it did not
10
further define the nature of contractor defenses.
Part I of this Note will present the facts and holdings of L-3 Services
and CACI and briefly describe the underlying law. Part II will critique
the panel’s holdings, argue that the panel conflated the doctrines of
sovereign immunity and federal preemption, and detail the
procedural and practical consequences of the panel’s conflation.
Part II will then conclude that preemption analysis is the most
appropriate approach to both protecting the federal interests
inherent in military actions abroad and the ability of foreign citizens
to hold military contractors accountable for their actions.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Cases: Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc. and Al Shimari v. CACI
International, Inc.
Both L-3 Services and CACI were suits filed by Iraqi citizens against
11
American military contractors. The plaintiffs in both cases claimed
12
that they were detained by the United States military in Iraq. The
United States government had hired contractors to provide
13
interrogation and translation services at military detention sites.
While the Fourth Circuit panel noted in CACI that the contractors
were required to comply with U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
14
interrogation policies and practices, the plaintiffs in both L-3 Services
8. CACI, 658 F.3d at 417.
9. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir.
May 11, 2012) (en banc).
10. See id. at *3 (declining to express an “opinion as to the merits of any
immunity” asserted by CACI and also declining to draw a distinction between
derivative sovereign immunity and derivative absolute official immunity); see also infra
Part II.A (arguing that the Fourth Circuit conflated two different defenses potentially
available to military contractors and identifying the procedural incongruity that
results from this conflation).
11. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414.
12. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414.
13. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414.
14. CACI, 658 F.3d at 415.
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and CACI asserted that their detentions in Abu Ghraib and other
facilities involved dangerous stress positions; beatings; assaults;
sensory deprivation; food, water, and sleep deprivation; and other
15
abuses that were in direct contravention of DOD policies. Despite
the factual similarities between these cases, the panel addressed two
different legal questions.
Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc. and the court’s appellate jurisdiction
over appeal from a denied motion to dismiss
In L-3 Services, the Fourth Circuit panel addressed whether it had
appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the
16
defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Seventy-two Iraqis initiated the
litigation in L-3 Services after being detained by the United States in
17
The plaintiffs alleged that federal government contractors
Iraq.
tortured them and other detainees rather than simply providing
18
translation services during interrogations.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on “numerous
19
20
grounds,” which the district court denied.
The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial and remanded the case with
21
instructions to dismiss the litigation. While the Fourth Circuit cited
CACI to justify its substantive holding regarding federal preemption,
its decision in L-3 Services provided the reasoning for asserting
22
appellate jurisdiction in both cases.
Though the Fourth Circuit panel acknowledged that its appellate
23
jurisdiction is generally limited to final district court decisions, the
panel held that the appeal was justified under the “collateral order
24
doctrine” for several reasons.
First, the court asserted that the
questions of immunity, separation of powers, and federal preemption
raised by the appeal could not be revisited upon a final district court
25
decision.
Second, the court reasoned that the “battlefield
1.

15. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 416.
16. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 203.
17. Id. at 202.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 202–03 (identifying the political question doctrine, law of war
immunity, federal preemption, and derivative absolute immunity as the grounds
asserted for dismissal).
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 203–05 (holding that a district court’s denial of a sovereign immunitybased motion to dismiss was immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine because allowing the case to proceed would require judicial scrutiny of
military policies, which immunity precludes).
23. Id. at 204.
24. Id. at 204–05; see infra Part I.B (defining the collateral order doctrine).
25. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 205.
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preemption” asserted by the defendants was equivalent to immunity
and, therefore, must be addressed before trial to preserve the
26
Third, the court approached the questions of federal
defense.
preemption and immunity as distinct from the merits of the
27
litigation.
Finally, the court identified a “strong public policy”
rationale for preventing actions taken in foreign war zones from
28
being scrutinized and litigated in civil courts.
Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc. and possible defenses against
tort liability for contractors acting abroad
The CACI litigation was commenced by four Iraqi citizens who had
29
been detained by the United States military in Abu Ghraib prison.
Like the litigation in L-3 Services, CACI involved contractors who were
retained by the military to provide interrogation and intelligence
30
collection services.
The plaintiffs alleged that the contractors
31
participated in a conspiracy to torture the prisoners. The district
32
court denied the contractor’s motion to dismiss.
In CACI, the Fourth Circuit panel examined the substantive law
33
regarding the military contractors’ liability in federal court. The
court determined that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims of
34
torture and abuse. The court reasoned that because the contractors
acted on behalf of the United States, important federal interests were
35
implicated by the litigation. In particular, the court noted that civil
36
actions would place a burden on military personnel, and potential
liability would impact the availability and cost of services required by
37
The court determined that these interests were
the military.
2.

26. Id. The court later defined “battlefield preemption” as “complete eradication of
the ‘imposition per se’ of tort law, that is the complete removal of even the possibility
of suit from the battlefield.” Id. at 206 (citing Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7
(D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011)).
27. Id. at 205.
28. Id.
29. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No.
10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 414–15; see also id. at 416 (“While some of the abuses that the plaintiffs
detailed in the allegations of their complaint appear to have been approved by the
military . . . others were clearly not.”).
32. Id. at 415. Like the motion to dismiss in L-3 Services, the defendants’ motion
to dismiss relied on the political question doctrine, derivative sovereign immunity,
and federal preemption. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 417–19.
36. Id. at 418.
37. Id.
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sufficiently weighty to justify preempting the plaintiffs’ state tort
38
actions.
Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit dismissed both L-3 Services and
39
CACI. The Court rejected the panel’s reasoning that the circuit
court’s denial of the contractors’ motion to dismiss was a final
40
decision permitting appellate jurisdiction.
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Appellate Jurisdiction
The litigation in L-3 Services and CACI first arrived in the Fourth
Circuit on appeal from the district court denials of the defendants’
41
motions to dismiss. A denial of a motion to dismiss is generally
insufficient to grant appellate jurisdiction to federal courts of
42
appeals. The “collateral order doctrine,” however, allows appellate
43
jurisdiction over non-final judgments in certain circumstances. This
expansion of appellate jurisdiction beyond the strict boundaries of
the final order requirement is premised on the contention that nonfinal orders, including denials of motions to dismiss, may be of
44
sufficient importance to merit review before litigation is terminated.
For example, cases implicating a right to avoid trial, such as
immunity or violation of the double jeopardy prohibition, cannot be
adequately reviewed after trial because the right to avoid trial has
45
already been violated and cannot be remedied later. Courts can,
therefore, review a non-final order if the order “[1] conclusively
determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue
38. Id. at 417.
39. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir.
May 11, 2012) (en banc).
40. Id.
41. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 202–03 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated
sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May
11, 2012) (en banc); CACI, 658 F.3d at 416.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”
(emphasis added)); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658–59 (1977)
(noting that only a “small class of cases” are not subject to the final-judgment rule
and holding that a pretrial order to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds is one such case).
43. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1949)
(recognizing appellate jurisdiction from non-final orders, but limiting the availability
of such appeals to rights that are “separable from” the rights asserted in the litigation
and significant enough to require a review that might not be possible after a final
judgment).
44. See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350–53 (2006) (holding that, in the
pretrial order context, the collateral order doctrine does not apply to the “mere
avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public
interest,” such as separation of powers, government efficiency, respecting a state’s
dignitary interests, and mitigating the government’s advantage over an individual).
45. Id. at 350–51.
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completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [is]
46
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Because
the collateral order doctrine allows appellate jurisdiction in limited
circumstances, the grounds for appeal will determine whether an
appeal is available.
C. Defenses Available for Contractors Sued Under State Tort Law
In asserting a defense for private action, government contractors
primarily argue that a contractual relationship with the government
entitles the contractor to similar protections in litigation as those
47
granted to the government.
Generally, courts have extended
defenses to government contractors based on a theory of either
derivative sovereign immunity or federal preemption of state tort
48
actions.
1.

Derivative sovereign immunity
49
The government enjoys an absolute immunity from litigation.
Though government actions can be challenged through suits against
50
government officers, contractors often argue that their contractual

46. Id. at 350 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 144 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988) (considering a
contractor defense based on the incompatibility of the state-imposed standard of
care and the specifications for production established in the government contract);
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that contractor
defendants were not subject to state tort law for actions taken during a military
contract in Iraq), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011). See generally George E. Hurley,
Jr., Government Contractor Liability in Military Design Defect Cases: The Need for Judicial
Intervention, 117 MIL. L. REV. 219 (1987) (reviewing cases involving military
contractors’ product liability before Boyle was decided by the Supreme Court); Aaron
L. Jackson, Civilian Soldiers: Expanding the Government Contractor Defense to Reflect the
New Corporate Role in Warfare, 63 A.F. L. REV. 211 (2009) (arguing that existing
precedent focused on product manufacturing liability should be extended to reflect
the role of government contractors in providing military services).
48. See generally Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005)
(examining the use of private contractors in different areas of government and the
apparent lack of accountability for contractors’ actions); Larry J. Gusman, Note,
Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial
Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1990)
(considering Boyle as a hybrid of several different theories of government immunity
and arguing against the creation of a “Contractor Defense”).
49. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (reasoning that sovereign
power and interests would be significantly harmed if private citizens were constantly
able to litigate against the federal government); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States . . . .”).
50. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 205 (rejecting the argument that officers, as agents of the
United States, are entitled to sovereign immunity).
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relationship with the government entitles them to derivative
51
sovereign immunity.
Where contractor activities are integrated with a government
function, the government’s sovereign immunity can be extended to
52
cover the contractor. In Mangold v. Analytic Services, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit concluded that a government contractor would not be liable
for statements made to a government official during an official
53
investigation. The court reasoned that immunity was recognized as
54
a means of protecting government functions. Thus “[i]f absolute
immunity protects a particular governmental function . . . it is a small
55
step to protect that function when delegated to private contractors.”
The federal government can, however, waive sovereign immunity
56
and subject itself to liability. The most significant example of this
57
waiver is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA permits
58
tort litigation against the government, but it contains several
exceptions that preserve sovereign immunity against certain types of
59
suits.
2.

Federal preemption of state tort claims
Rather than extend sovereign immunity to contractors, some
courts have simply precluded state tort actions by finding the state
60
laws are preempted by federal interests. The Supremacy Clause of
51. See Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1447 (4th Cir. 1996)
(defining the applicability of sovereign immunity by the governmental function,
rather than the identity of the party performing that function, and holding that “the
public interest may demand that immunity protect [government contractors] to the
same extent that it protects government employees”).
52. 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996).
53. Id. at 1449.
54. Id. at 1448.
55. Id. at 1447–48.
56. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (authorizing original
jurisdiction in federal courts for suits in state tort law listing the United States as a
defendant, with certain exceptions); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(“The United States is protected from unconsented suit under the ancient common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity.” (emphasis added)).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
58. Id. § 1346(b)(1).
59. Id. § 2680. Contractors can be deemed federal employees but only if the
federal government controls detailed physical aspects of their work. See United
States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 808 (1976) (noting that receiving federal money or
being subject to federal regulations is irrelevant to whether contractors qualify as
federal employees); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530 (1973) (finding that
prison workers employed pursuant to a contract with the federal government were
not federal government employees because the government had no role in physically
supervising the employees).
60. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (noting that
federal statutes or common law replace state law where “uniquely federal interests . . .
are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control
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the U.S. Constitution mandates that all federal laws are the “supreme
61
State laws, such as tort law, are, therefore,
Law of the Land.”
62
preempted where they conflict with federal laws.
When the Supreme Court previously considered liability for
military contractors, it held that important federal interests could
63
preempt state tort actions. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the
Court held that the federal government’s important interest in
military operations preempted a state wrongful death claim by the
64
family of a helicopter pilot. The Court in Boyle reasoned that the
duty of care imposed by state tort law significantly interfered with the
contractor’s duty to follow the terms and specifications of its contract
65
with the federal government.
Thus, the Court recognized that
federal interests could preempt state law even where no conflicting
66
67
federal law existed. In Saleh v. Titan Corp., the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit extended the Boyle
68
preemption to include military contractors in Iraq.
In both of these cases, the courts defined the bounds of federal
preemption using specific exceptions to the FTCA. In Boyle, the
Court relied on the FTCA exception for government officials
69
exercising their legal discretion. In Saleh, the court extended Boyle
70
to include the “combatant activities” exception to the FTCA.
that state law is preempted”).
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507–08 (detailing the circumstances in which the
conflict between federal interests and state laws will require that the state law be
displaced by federal law).
63. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
64. Id. at 502, 511–12.
65. Id. at 509.
66. See id. at 512 (explaining that a government contractor will not be liable
under state tort law where the government provides specifications, the contractor
conforms to those specifications, and the contractor warns the government about
potential dangers).
67. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011).
68. Id. at 5. The logic of extending Boyle to military contractors in Iraq is beyond
the scope of this Note. This Note will not address the extension of Boyle in Saleh, but
it will assume that Saleh represents the current state of the law and that some form of
federal law will protect military contractors in Iraq.
69. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509, 511 (identifying the FTCA as an appropriate
“limiting principle” for the bounds of federal interest that would require preempting
state tort law). The decision in Boyle explicitly rejected the reasoning of the lower
court, which relied on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting tort claims by members
of the military. See id. at 509–10 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950))
(determining that only the FTCA avoids contractor preemption that is overly broad
or overly narrow). See generally, Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned
Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 394 (2010) (detailing the evolution and utility of the Feres
doctrine).
70. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6 (describing the combatant activities exception to the
FTCA as the most appropriate standard to measure the extent of federal preemption
in cases involving military contractors’ actions abroad); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)
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Because these cases preclude tort action against government
contractors on the basis of preemption, the decisions do not actually
extend sovereign immunity to contractors. Rather, the two decisions
overlay preemption precedent with the FTCA’s sovereign immunity
71
framework.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Conflation of Preemption and Immunity Defenses
The Fourth Circuit panel opinions in L-3 Services and CACI purport
to address two different, but interrelated, issues. First, the opinion in
L-3 Services defended the court’s ability to render a decision by
holding that the Fourth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the
72
denial of a motion to dismiss. Second, the court in CACI held that
federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims against several military
73
contractors.
A court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from denial of a motion to
dismiss is contingent on the contractors asserting an immunity
74
defense. The panel in CACI held explicitly that important federal
75
interests preempted the tort claims asserted by the Iraqi plaintiffs.
The panel in L-3 Services, however, justified the court’s appellate
jurisdiction by citing prior Supreme Court decisions applying the
76
collateral order doctrine to immunity assertions. Additionally, the
panel in L-3 Services described the goal of federal preemption as “the
77
complete removal of even the possibility of suit from the battlefield.”
The basis of the panel’s opinion in L-3 Services indicates that it
utilized more of an immunity rationale rather than a preemption

(2006) (reserving federal sovereign immunity against claims arising out of
“combatant activities”).
71. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (using the exceptions to the FTCA as a proxy statute
to identify federal interests that may conflict with state tort law); Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6
(applying a different FTCA exception that fit the fact pattern before the court).
72. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub
nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11,
2012) (en banc).
73. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No.
10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
74. See supra Part I.B (describing the collateral order doctrine). Immunity is not
the only defense that would allow appeal under the collateral order doctrine, but
preemption likely would not succeed. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794, 801 (1989) (distinguishing between true rights not to stand trial
(immunity) and substantive law that could result in termination or dismissal of the
litigation (preemption)).
75. CACI, 658 F.3d at 420.
76. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 204–05.
77. Id. at 206.
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rationale. Preemption analysis determines whether state law can
78
apply. Immunity, on the other hand, determines whether any law
79
will apply. The panel’s reliance on immunity analysis in L-3 Services
and its assertion that “preemption” is necessary to keep battlefield
conduct out of the courts indicates that the Fourth Circuit meant to
80
remove military contractor conduct from courts entirely. This is a
different aim than simply displacing state law in deference to federal
81
interests. While preemption analysis determines whether state or
federal substantive law governs a situation—or, more precisely,
whether state law can apply—the panel’s reasoning in L-3 Services
reflects a desire to remove these contractor suits from the courts
82
entirely.
B. Contradictory Holdings in L-3 Services and CACI
The Fourth Circuit panel’s conflation of preemption and immunity
defenses led to contradictory holdings in L-3 Services and CACI. As
the dissent in L-3 Services argued, designating an immunity or
preemption defense is central to determining whether the Fourth
Circuit had jurisdiction to review these cases before the district court
83
reached a final decision on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit’s
decisions were contradictory because the court relied on an immunity
84
defense for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction but relied on
the federal preemption doctrine to hold that the contractors’
85
motions to dismiss should have been granted.
78. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1988) (explaining
that state law can only be “displaced”).
79. See id. at 504–12 (distinguishing between the preemption of state tort claims
against government contractors necessary to protect federal interests and the
absolute immunity preventing any claims at all against the federal government).
80. See L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 204–06 (“Just as immunity from suit must be
recognized in the early stages of litigation in order to have its full effect, battlefield
preemption must also be recognized in order to prevent judicial scrutiny of an active
military zone.”).
81. See id. at 209 (King, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between immunity—the
right not to stand trial—and preemption—the displacement of state tort actions by
federal interests).
82. See id. at 203–06 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that federal preemption
represents a strong public policy interest during wartime “to free military
commanders from the doubts and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to
civil suit” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. See id. at 206 (King, J., dissenting) (asserting that immunity and preemption
are different doctrines and should not be conflated for the purposes of determining
jurisdiction to preserve the narrowness of the collateral order doctrine).
84. Id. at 204–05 (majority opinion) (citing cases involving presidential absolute
immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity, and double
jeopardy as support for finding appellate jurisdiction in a case involving federal
preemption).
85. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
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By declaring that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ state tort
claims, the Fourth Circuit eviscerated its immunity-based
86
jurisdiction. By basing its jurisdiction on an immunity defense, but
reasoning that the case should be dismissed due to federal
preemption, the Fourth Circuit panel confused the two doctrines and
missed an opportunity to clarify the nature of the protection enjoyed
by military contractors.
The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision resolved the contradiction
between the two panel decisions on jurisdictional grounds, but left
open the question as to the exact nature and extent of the defenses
87
available to government contractors. By dismissing the appeals, the
majority both clarified that the defenses asserted by the contractors in
L-3 Services and CACI are not tantamount to immunity from suit and
88
avoided deciding the merits of those defenses. While the en banc
decision begins to clarify the nature of a contractor defense, further
development is necessary.
C. The Importance of Maintaining the Distinction Between Preemption and
Immunity
Though the distinction between immunity and preemption
89
defenses had only procedural consequences in L-3 Services and CACI,
the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, which ameliorated the panel’s
confusion of these two doctrines, helps to resolve the current
ambiguity surrounding the status of government contractors
90
generally and of military contractors specifically. While preemption
is simply the removal of state tort law as the substantive standard

conclude . . . that the plaintiffs’ tort claims are preempted . . . .”), vacated, No. 101891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
86. See L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 209 (King, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
preemption under Saleh could be effectively reviewed after a trial in the district court
and arguing that allowing immediate appeal in L-3 Services and CACI overextended
the reach of the collateral order doctrine); see also Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d
476, 486 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a claim of federal preemption based on the
combatant activities exception to the FTCA is not immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine).
87. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir.
May 11, 2012) (en banc).
88. Id. at *8, 13 (“Saleh preemption falls squarely on the side of being a defense
to liability and not an immunity from suit”).
89. See Steve Vladeck, Immunity vs. Preemption in the Fourth Circuit Torture Cases—
And Why That Distinction Matters, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:16 PM),
www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/immunity-vs-preemption
(identifying
the
jurisdictional element as the most likely grounds for the panel decision to be
overturned).
90. Jackson, supra note 47, at 219 (assuming that the Boyle Court’s examination of
the FTCA represented an extension of immunity to government contractors).
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governing a defendant’s behavior, immunity provides protection
91
against all future lawsuits.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged in L-3 Services and CACI that
92
military contractors can cause significant harm to foreign civilians.
In contrast, the court in Saleh indicated that military contractors
93
enjoy some kind of protection from litigation. A grant of immunity
precludes all future suits against military contractors who commit
abuses in foreign war zones, while recognition of federal preemption
94
of state tort law claims under Boyle precludes only state tort actions.
D. Preemption Is the Appropriate Understanding of a Government
Contractor Defense
As the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision seems to indicate, federal
preemption is the more appropriate characterization of the defenses
available to government contractors acting in military operations
because such defenses preclude only state tort actions and does not
completely remove military contractors from court. The Court in
Boyle emphasized that important governmental interests in the
manufacturing of military equipment would be jeopardized by
allowing a contractor to be liable under state product liability
95
doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit panel identified several similarly
important federal interests in L-3 Services and CACI: the ability to
interrogate detainees in foreign battlefields; the ability of military
commanders to complete their assignments without being “haled
into [civilian] courts” to provide testimony; and the ability to conduct
96
The
military campaigns without the interference of litigation.
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (waiving federal sovereign immunity for certain
civil actions by granting district courts “original jurisdiction” over suits naming the
United States as a defendant); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512
(1988) (characterizing the federal preemption recognized in the case for privately
produced military equipment as “displacement”).
92. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 418–19 (4th Cir. 2011)
(accepting as true the plaintiffs’ allegations of torture, abuse, and injury), vacated,
No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
93. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that military
contractors were not liable under District of Columbia tort law, but blending
discussions of federal preemption and sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3055 (2011).
94. The preclusion of state tort claims is significant.
However, federal
preemption leaves open the possibility that other causes of action may be available as
recourse against military contractors. Immunity removes military contractors from
the jurisdiction of federal courts altogether.
See supra notes 75–78 and
accompanying text (referring to the fact that federal preemption implicates only the
displacement of state tort claims).
95. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 (noting that the requirements of the defendant’s
military contract and the state duty of care were mutually exclusive).
96. See Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating an
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concern for costs to the government in CACI mirrors a concern in
Boyle that any costs of contractor liability would simply be passed onto
the federal government in the next contract—thus defeating the
97
purpose of sovereign immunity.
The court’s justifications for preemption may represent legitimate
concerns that validate the displacement of state tort law. If the
decision in Saleh represents the current understanding of the law
98
governing suits against military contractors, it is likely that those
actions will be subject to some limitation. The question, therefore, is
99
whether that limitation is based on immunity or preemption. The
uniquely federal interests of foreign military actions likely justify
100
preemption. Immunity, however, is inappropriate in cases alleging
torture by military contractors. Immunity, the right to avoid trial,
would preclude all actions against military contractors, even where
the contractors are not performing a governmental function that
101
would require extending sovereign immunity.
Additionally, while
state tort law preemption precludes further litigation of L-3 Services
and CACI, it does not preclude other suits that might render military
102
contractors liable for their actions.
unwillingness to risk subjecting military personnel to improper court appearances or
depositions), vacated sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL
1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc); CACI, 658 F.3d at 418–19 (citing Saleh,
580 F.3d at 7 (coining the term “battlefield preemption”)).
97. See CACI, 658 F.3d at 418 (analogizing the cost and availability of contract
workers to the increased cost of manufactured goods resulting from contractors
compensating for their tort liability by increasing charges to the government).
98. The facts in Saleh were identical to the facts in L-3 Services and CACI. Compare
CACI, 658 F.3d at 414 (suit against United States military contractors by Iraqi citizens
detained in Iraq), with Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2 (suit against United States military
contractors by Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq). See also supra
note 65, which identifies the correctness of the Saleh decision as beyond the scope of
this Note.
99. The defendants in L-3 Services and CACI based their motions to dismiss on
several other grounds, such as the political question doctrine. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at
202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 415. However, the Fourth Circuit focused primarily on the
questions of derivative sovereign immunity and preemption. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at
203; CACI, 658 F.3d at 415. This Note, therefore, focuses only on these two options
as well.
100. See supra notes 95–97 (agreeing that the federal interests at stake in litigation
involving military contractors may be sufficient to require preemption of state law).
101. See CACI, 658 F.3d at 416 (acknowledging that some incidents of torture and
abuse went beyond the authorized actions outlined in military guidelines). Contra
Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1447 (4th Cir. 1996) (indicating that
participation in a governmental investigation is sufficiently integrated with a
government function to justify extending sovereign immunity to a government
contractor).
102. Displacement of state law does not, for instance, preclude actions under
federal law; federal law or “federal interests” form the basis for displacement under
the Supremacy Clause. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988)
(analyzing the clearly identifiable federal law or interests that would justify
displacement of a state tort action).
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CONCLUSION
The L-3 Services and CACI cases presented several challenges for
federal court jurisprudence: the application of the doctrines of
collateral order jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and federal
preemption to military contractors’ actions overseas. Because Boyle
and Saleh indicate that some type of defense will be available for
military contractors, the primary question presented by these cases is
the form the defense will take. While the Fourth Circuit panel
opinions in L-3 Services and CACI appeared to conflate immunity and
preemption, the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision correctly resolved
the collateral order doctrine question in favor of a preemption-like
analysis that does not grant contractors an automatic right to avoid
trial entirely. The facts of L-3 Services and CACI indicate that military
contractors can do significant harm to civilians, either through
authorized interrogation or by unauthorized torture. While an
immunity defense precludes any legal liability for military contractors,
preemption of certain state tort suits preserves the possibility that
other federal actions would remain available. The two doctrines are
intertwined as a result of the federal interests at stake in military
contractor litigation. Clear boundaries between immunity and
preemption must be maintained, however, to ensure that
government contractors are held accountable for damages caused by
their inappropriate actions in war zones.

